
**TOP SECRET** 



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# IP Profiling Analytics & Mission Impacts

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SIGINT

## **Example IP Profile Problem**

Target appears on IP address, wish to understand network context more fully

#### Example Quova look-up & response for I

Lat. 60.00 Long: -95.00 (in frozen tundra W. of Hudson Bay) City: unknown Country: Canada,

Operator: Bell Canada, Sympatico

#### Issues with IP look-up data:

is it actually revealing, or is it opaque is the data even current, or is it out-of-date was the data ever accurate in the first place

## **Objectives**


Develop new analytics to provide richer contextual data about a network address

Apply analytics against Tipping & Cueing objectives

Build upon artefact of techniques to develop new needle-in-a-haystack analytic – contact chaining across air-gaps

## **Analytic Concept – Start with Travel Node**

Begin with single seed Wi-Fi IP address of intl. airport




Assemble set of user IDs seen on network address over two weeks

# **Profiling Travel Nodes – Next Step**

Follow IDs backward and forward in recent time

- Earlier IP clusters of:
  - local hotels
  - domestic airports
  - local transportation hubs
  - local internet cafes

- etc.




Later IP clusters of:

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- other intl. airports
- domestic airports
- major intl. hotels

## **IP Hopping Forward in Time**

Follow IDs forward in time to next IP & note delta time



## **Data Reality**

The analytic produced excellent profiles, but was more complex than initial concept suggests

Data had limited aperture – Canadian Special Source major CDN ISPs team with US email majors, losing travel coverage

Behaviour at airports

little lingering on arrival; arrivals using phones, not WiFi still, some Wi-Fi use when waiting for connecting flight/baggage different terminals: domestic/international; also private lounges

Very many airports and hotels served by large Boingo private network

not seen in aperture; traffic seems to return via local Akamai node

#### **Tradecraft Development Data Set**


Have two weeks worth of ID-IP data from Canadian Special Source –

Had program access to Quova dataset connecting into Atlas database

Had seed knowledge of a single Canadian Airport WiFi IP address

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## Hop Geo Profile From CDN Airport Intl. Terminal




Profiled/seed IP location: 
Quare = geographic location

Hopped-to IP location: Line height = numbers of unique hopped-to IPs at location

Plot of where else IDs seen at seed IP have been seen in two weeks Plot shows most hopped to IPs are nearby - confirming reported seed geo data

## **Effect of Invalid Geo Information**



Profiled/seed IP location: Square = geographic location

Hopped-to IP location: Line height = numbers of unique hopped-to IPs at location

#### *Effect of invalid seed geo information readily apparent*

#### **Hop-Out Destinations Seen**

Other domestic airports


Other terminals, lounges, transport hubs

Hotels in many cities

Mobile gateways in many cities

Etc.

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


**Domestic terminal** 

Closeness of majority of hopped-to IPs confirms geo data

But, domestic airport can also look like a busy hotel ...

## IDs Presence Profile at "Discovered" Airport



#### **Profiles of Discovered Hotel**

Many IDs present over a few days

#### **Profiles of Discovered Enterprise**

Time/days  $\rightarrow$ 


Regular temporal presence (M-F) with local geographic span Contrasts well against travel/roaming nodes

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## **Discovered Coffee Shop, Library**

Coffee shop

Time/days  $\rightarrow$ 



Time/days  $\rightarrow$ 

Similar patterns of mixed temporal & local geographic presence


#### **Discovered Wireless Gateway**

Wireless gateway not unlike a hotel, except ...

Time/days  $\rightarrow$ 

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## **Partial Range Profile of Wireless Gateway**



For wireless gateway, range behaviour is revealing Most IDs seen on an IP are also scattered across entire range ID totals & traffic across full range is very high

## **Mission Impact of IP Profiling**

#### Tipping and Cueing Task Force (TCTF)

- a 5-Eyes effort to enable the SIGINT system to provide real-time alerts of events of interest
- alert to: target country location changes, webmail logins with time-limited cookies etc.

Targets/Enemies still target air travel and hotels airlines: shoe/underwear/printer bombs ... hotels: Mumbai, Kabul, Jakarta, Amman, Islamabad, Egyptian Sinai ...

Analytic can hop-sweep through IP address space to identify set of IP addresses for hotels and airports

*detecting target presence within set will trigger an urgent alert* aim to productize analytics to reliably produce set of IPs for alerting

# **IP Profiling Summary**

Different categories of IP ownership/use show distinct characteristics

airports, hotels, coffee shops, enterprises, wireless gateways etc. clear characteristics enable formal modeling developments clear identification of hotels and airports enables critical Tipping & Cueing tradecraft

Geo-hop profile can confirm/refute IP geo look-up information

later could fold-in time deltas for enhanced modeling

Can "sweep" a region/city for roaming access points to IP networks

leads to a new needle-in-a-haystack analytic ...

## **Tradecraft Problem Statement**

A kidnapper based in a rural area travels to an urban area to make ransom calls

can't risk bringing attention to low-population rural area won't use phone for any other comms (or uses payphones ...)

# Assumption: He has another device that accesses IP networks from public access points

having a device isn't necessary, could use internet cafes, libraries etc. he is also assumed to use IP access around the time of ransom calls

Question: Knowing the time of the ransom calls can we discover the kidnapper's IP ID/device

"contact chain" across air-gap (not a correlation of selectors)

## **Solution Outline**

With earlier IP profiling analytics, we can "sweep" a city/region to discover and determine public accesses

We can then select which IP network IDs are seen as active in all times surrounding the known ransom calls reduce set to a shortlist

Then we examine the reduced set of IP network IDs and eliminate baseline heavy users in the area that fall into the set intersection just because they are always active

that is, eliminate those that are highly active outside the times of the ransom calls

hopefully leaves only the one needle from the haystack

## First Proof-of-Concept

Swept a modest size city and discovered two high traffic public access ranges with >300,000 active IDs over 2 weeks used for initial expediency due to computational intensity

Presumed that there were 3 ransom calls, each 50 hours apart during daytime, looked for IDs within 1 Hr of calls reduce large set to a shortlist of just 19 IP network IDs

Examined activity level of 19 IP network IDs – how many presences each had in 1 Hr slots over two weeks

main worry as the computation was running: there would be a lot of IDs that showed just a handful of appearances: e.g. 3, 4, 5 instances

#### **ID Presence of Shortlist**

Each horizontal line shows presence of ID over time/hour-slots

Postulated presence of kidnapper/target

Time/hour-slots  $\rightarrow$ 

Happy result: least active ID had appearances in 40 hour-slots! Thus could eliminate all, leaving just the kidnapper (if he was there)

# **Big-Data Computational Challenge**

All the previous analytics, while successful experimentally, ran much too slowly to allow for practical productization

CARE: Collaborative Analytics Research Environment a big-data system being trialed at CSEC (with NSA launch assist) non-extraordinary hardware minimal impedance between memory, storage and processors highly optimized, in-memory database capabilities columnar storage, high performance vector functional runtime powerful but challenging programming language (derived from APL)

Result of first experiments with CARE: game-changing run-time for hop-profiles reduced from 2+ Hrs to several seconds allows for tradecraft to be profitably productized

## **Overall Summary**

#### IP profiling showing terrific value

significant analytic asset for IP networks and target mobility enables critical capability within Tipping & Cueing Task force working to productize on powerful new computational platform broader SSO accesses/apertures coming online at CSEC look to formalize models & fold-in timing deltas

# A new needle-in-a-haystack analytic is viable: contact chaining across air-gaps

- enabled by sweep capability of IP profiling
- should test further to understand robustness with respect to loosening assumptions of target behaviour
- beyond kidnapping, tradecraft could also be used for any target that makes occasional forays into other cities/regions

### Tradecraft Studio Example



#### Possible route for productizing analytics